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NOTES
VOLUNTARY AFFIRMATIVE ACTION PLANS BY PUBLIC
EMPLOYERS: THE DISPARITY IN STANDARDS
BETWEEN TITLE VII AND THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE
INTRODUCTION

Nearly ten years after the Supreme Court first attempted to resolve the
legality of affirmative action, 1 the issue remains as controversial as ever.2
Supporters of affirmative action believe it represents a necessary remedy
for centuries of segregation. 3 Opponents consider it a new problem, not a
solution.4 The Court has adopted an essentially moderate approach, approving affirmative action generally,' but narrowly interpreting the
power of courts,6 legislators,7 and employers8 to implement such plans.
Thus, even when the Court has rejected a specific plan, it has reaffirmed
the general permissibility of some affirmative action. 9
The goal of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196410 is to ensure
equal employment opportunity." Originally, Title VII applied only to
private employers, 2 but Congress extended its provisions to public employers in 1972.1' Voluntary 4 affirmative action plans"5 adopted by pub1. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Earlier, in 1973, the
Supreme Court had granted certiorari to hear an affirmative action case, see DeFunis v.
Odegaard, 414 U.S. 1038 (1973), but later declared the case moot, thus failing to reach
the merits. See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1974).
2. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1987, § 4 at 1, col. 1 (noting the broad spectrum
of views on affirmative action).
3. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 287 (1986) (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 406-07 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Kennedy, Persuasion and Distrust" A Comment on the Affirmative Action Debate, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 1327, 1329 (1986).
4. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1475 (1987) (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Abram, Affirmative Action: FairShakers and Social Engineers, 99 Harv.
L. Rev. 1312, 1318 (1986).
5. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 287 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); infra notes 37-113 and accompanying text.
6. See United States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1064-65 (1987); Local No. 28,
Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3050 (1986).
7. See Fulilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490-91 (1980).
8. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1454 (1987).
9. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 278-80 (1986).
10. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)); see infra note 37 (text of § 703(a) of Title VII).
11. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); infra notes 37-40 and
accompanying text.
12. See C. Sullivan, M. Zimmer & R. Richards, Federal Statutory Law of Employment Discrimination § 2.11, at 203 (1980) [hereinafter Sullivan].
13. See The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 ("EEOA"), Pub. L No. 92261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972). The EEOA extended Title VII's provisions simply by changing
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lic employers' 6 are state action, 17 and therefore are subject to attack on
both equal protection18 and Title VII' 9 grounds. The Supreme Court's
recent decision in Johnson v. TransportationAgency,2 0 makes it clear that

Title VII shields employers adopting such plans from liability when they
can demonstrate that they are correcting a manifest racial or gender imbalance in the job category in question. 2' The equal protection standard
the definition of persons covered. See 86 Stat. 103. The law's substantive provisions
therefore apply with the same force to public and private employers. See Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977); H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(1971), reprintedin 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2137, 2152; S. Rep. No. 415,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1971).
14. Voluntary affirmative action plans are those that are adopted unilaterally by an
employer, see, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1446-47 (1987),
or as part of a collective bargaining agreement, see, e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber,
443 U.S. 193, 197-98 (1979), or pursuant to a consent decree, see Local No. 93, Int'l
Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 3063, 3073 (1986). They do not
include plans mandated by court order after adjudication of liability. See, e.g., United
States v. Paradise, 107 S. Ct. 1053, 1065 (1987); Local No. 28, Sheet Metal Workers v.
EEOC, 106 S. Ct. 3019, 3050 (1986).
15. For purposes of this Note, affirmative action plans are those that use race, sex or
ethnicity as one criterion in a hiring or promotion plan. This excludes plans that use such
factors as their sole criterion-that is, impose rigid quotas. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1454 (1987). It also excludes plans that involve layoffs,
which the Supreme Court has declared unconstitutional, see Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 282-84 (1986) (plurality), and violative of Title VII, see Firefighters
Local No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 581-83 (1984).
16. Title VII includes in its definition of employers, "governments, governmental
agencies, [and] political subdivisions." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1982). This definition,
however, does not include the personal staffs of elected officials. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f)
(1982).
17. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273 & n.4 (1986). See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 10-11 (1883) (discussing "state action" within the
context of the fourteenth amendment); 2 R. Rotunda, J. Nowak & J. Young, Treatise on
Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 16.1 (1986) [hereinafter Rotunda]
(same).
18. See infra notes 79-113 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 46-78 and accompanying text.
20. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987).
21. See id. at 1452. A manifest imbalance is a significant, statistical, racial or sexual
disparity in a workforce or specific job category compared with a relevant segment of the
population. See id. at 1452; United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208-09 (1979).
The definition of the relevant segment depends upon various factors. One factor is the
percentage of the population that possesses the skills to perform the job in question. If the
job requires no particular skills, "a comparison of the percentage of minorities or women
in the employer's work force with the percentage in the [total] area labor market ... is
appropriate." Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1452. When a job requires particular skills, "the
comparison should be with those in the labor force who possess the relevant qualifications." Id. The formula may be easier to apply in theory than in practice. Compare
Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1453-54 (implicitly approving agency's long-term goal of matching
percentage of women in skilled craft positions within the agency to percentage of women
in the area labor force) with id. at 1465 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment)
(proper benchmark statistic should be percentage of skilled craft workers in the area who
are women).
A court must also determine the size of the geographical area to be considered. Compare Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1304 n. 18 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (using as
its benchmark the District of Columbia workforce, despite the fact that the Department
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is less clear.22 Under the guise of strict judicial scrutiny of racial or gender classifications, this standard appears to require a showing of actual
past discrimination by the employer or his predecessors.'
The resulting ambiguity leaves public employers in a difficult position.2 4 As matters now stand, a state or local government agency that
wants to correct an obvious racial, ethnic or gender imbalance but cannot
prove purposeful past discrimination takes a large risk by instituting an
affirmative action plan.2 5 Even if the plan is shielded from Title VII liability, it still may be invalid on equal protection grounds.2 6 As a result,
some courts incorrectly read Title VII out of the analysis of voluntary
public affirmative action plans.27 In light of the broad power granted to
28
Congress by the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment,
however, the congressional intent that Title VII apply fully to public em-

ployers 29 deserves considerable constitutional weight. In fact, this Note
will argue that because of this power, the Title VII standard should define the equal protection standard.
The enforcement clause gives Congress the authority to pass laws de-

claring unconstitutional otherwise constitutional state action.30 By analogy, the enforcement clause gives Congress the power to declare

constitutional certain state actions that might otherwise be unconstitucould hire from surrounding Maryland and Virginia suburbs as well) with Hammon v.
Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 77 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (using metropolitan area figure, which showed a
much lower percentage of blacks). See also infra notes 119-21 and accompanying text
(discussing Hammon and Ledoux).
22. See United States v. Paradise, 107 S.Ct. 1053, 1064 (1987).
23. See Wygant v.Jackson Bd.of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986) (plurality); infra
notes 101-02 and accompanying text. Some lower court cases indicate that an imbalance
in the relevant job category, if large enough, may indicate past discrimination even under
the constitutional standard. See, e.g., Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 358 (9th
Cir. 1987); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 887 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1040 (1984).
24. See Comment, Walking a Tightrope Without a Net Voluntary Aff rmative Action
Plans After Weber, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 457, 458 (1986) (public employers often institute
affirmative action plans in response to the threat of a Title VII suit or to settle a suit
already ified). One judge described the employer's dilemma as "walk[ng] a high tightrope," because no matter what action he takes, he may be held liable. See Weber v.
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230 (5th Cir. 1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting). A clear standard governing affirmative action would relieve this difficulty.
25. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 210-11 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring); Sullivan, supra note 12, § 13.4, at 828. An employer may not wish to make
an inquiry that might disclose his own past discrimination for fear of opening himself up
to liability. See infra note 74.
26. See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
27. See Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 887 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1040 (1984); Jones v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 642 F. Supp. 644, 656
(W.D. Tenn. 1986).
28. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article."). For discussion of the Supreme
Court's enforcement clause jurisprudence, see infra notes 139-64 and accompanying text.
29. See supra note 13.
30. See infra notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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tional.3a This power is limited only by the specific constitutional guarantees of individual rights. 32 Because congressionally authorized state
actions become, in effect, congressional actions, courts should review
them with the same deference they give acts initiated by Congress. 3
When it passed the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972
("EEOA"),3 4 extending Title VII to public employers, Congress acted
within its power to define the relevant equal protection standard. 5
Therefore, public employers acting under the statutory shield provided
by Congress in Title VII should receive the same constitutional deference
Congress would receive had it instituted a given affirmative action plan
itself. Because the Supreme Court has determined that Congress intended a manifest imbalance standard under Title VII, 3 6 that standard
should govern equal protection challenges as well.
This Note addresses the apparent disparity between the Title VII and
equal protection standards currently applicable to challenges to voluntary affirmative action plans instituted by public employers. Part I discusses Title VII and the development of the manifest imbalance standard
for public affirmative action plans. Part II analyzes the leading Supreme
Court cases applying the equal protection clause (or its fifth amendment
equivalent) to affirmative action plans and discusses the Court's failure to
articulate a clear standard. Part III analyzes some of the lower court
cases that review affirmative action plans under both Title VII and the
equal protection clause, showing the confusion engendered both by the
lack of a majority constitutional standard and the seeming disparity between the two standards. This Note concludes that Congress, by passing
the EEOA, exercised its power under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment to give public employers the authority to correct manifest imbalances in their workforces without violating the equal
protection clause.
31. See infra notes 151-54 and accompanying text.
32. See Cohen, CongressionalPower to InterpretDue Processand Equal Protection, 27
Stan. L. Rev. 603, 620 (1975). The methods by which Congress can enforce the equal
protection clause are limited by judicial construction of the substantive protections of
that clause. Thus, for example, Congress cannot, in light of the judicial bar on school
segregation, pass a law seeking to enforce the equal protection clause by mandating
school segregation. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966); see also
Bohrer, Bakke, Weber and Fullilove- Benign Discriminationand CongressionalPower to
Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, 56 Ind. L.J. 473, 495-96 (1981) (constitutionality of
a congressional statute barring school busing in contradiction of a state law depends on
whether Supreme Court has declared that equal protection clause guarantees right to be
bused); see also infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 180-85 and accompanying text.
34. See supra note 13.
35. See infra notes 155-60 and accompanying text.
36. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1452 (1987); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979); supra note 21.
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I.

TITLE VII

In its first comprehensive review of Title VII,3 Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.,3s the Supreme Court held that the statute's objective was "to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have op-

erated in the past to favor an identifiable group of white employees over

other employees."'39 To that end, the Court held that Congress meant to

bar all employment discrimination, both intentional and unintentional.'
Accordingly, the Court has developed two standards for establishing a

prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII.
Under the disparate treatment test, which addresses intentional discrimination, a plaintiff can establish a prima facie Title VII violation by

introducing evidence of discriminatory motive by his or her employer. 41

To combat unintentional employment discrimination-practices that are

discriminatory in effect, but without bad motive-as well as intentional
discrimination in cases where intent is hard to ascertain, the Court has

also held that a plaintiff may prove a Title VII violation by showing that
the employment practice in question has an improper disparate impact

according to race or sex.42 Under this test, introduced in Griggs,43 a suf37. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)). The heart of the statute is § 703(a), which provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The statute aims to assure equal employment opportunity. See
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429 (1971); 2 N. Dorsen, P. Bender, B.
Neuborne & S. Law, Political and Civil Rights in the United States 905 (4th ed. 1979).
38. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
39. Id at 429-30. See generally Sullivan, supra note 12, at § 1.2 (analyzing Griggs).
40. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
41. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977).
42. See Sullivan, supra note 12, § 1.5, at 33. Under disparate impact analysis, the
Court does not require proof of motive when it does not exist or would be unreasonably
difficult to prove. See Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15. The Court's finding that Title VII
"tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise" explains this standard. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973) (emphasis added); see also Griggs
v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971) ("The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.").
Although Title VII contains no explicit reference to disparate impact analysis, the legislative history accompanying passage of the EEOA, which followed Griggs, demonstrates the appropriateness of the Court's reasoning. The Senate report accompanying
the EEOA stated:
In 1964, employment discrimination tended to be viewed as a series of isolated
and distinguishable events, for the most part due to ill-will on the part of some
identifiable individual or organization.... Experience has shown this view to
be false.... Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the prob-
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ficient statistical imbalance" in a particular job category establishes a
prima facie case of past discrimination.45
A.

Title VII Applied to Affirmative Action

Title VII numbers among the most common bases of litigation in federal courts.4 6 One way that employers attempt to avoid Title VII litigation is by instituting affirmative action plans voluntarily, 47 thereby
enabling them to control the process of integration to a greater extent.48
lem in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional wrongs
S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. 5 (1971). See also H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2137, 2144 (referring favorably to the Griggs opinion).
43. See Sullivan, supra note 12, § 1.5, at 33-34; see also Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
44. Statistics suffice as proof in this context because the prima facie test for discriminatory impact is whether "facially neutral qualification standards work in fact disproportionately t6 exclude [applicants or employees]." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
329 (1977). The Supreme Court has stated that "absent explanation, it is ordinarily to be
expected that nondiscriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work force more
or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the community from which employees are hired." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324, 339 n.20 (1977).
For examples of numerical disparities that the Court has held are sufficient to make out
prima facie cases, see Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-30 (state policy of only hiring prison
guards between 5'2", 120 lbs. and 6'10", 300 lbs., thus excluding 41.13% of the female
population but less than 1% of the male population); Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299, 303-05 (1977) (blacks comprising 1.8% of teachers in particular
district in St. Louis County, Mo., compared to either 5.7% (black teachers in St. Louis
County) or 15.4% (black teachers in St. Louis city and county)). See also Bazemore v.
Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 399-401 (1986) (salary disparity between blacks and whites of $331
in 1974 and $395 in 1975).
45. See Sullivan, supra note 12, § 1.5, at 33-34. The Supreme Court has developed a
three-step process for handling disparate impact claims. In the first step, the plaintiff
"need only show that the facially neutral standards in question select applicants for hire
in a significantly discriminatory pattern." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329
(1977). The Court terms this a "prima facie case of discrimination." Id.; International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 (1977). In the second step, the
burden shifts to the employer to show that the challenged standard has a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory purpose. See Dothard,433 U.S. at 329; McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If the employer meets his burden, the plaintiff has a
final chance to "introduce evidence that the proffered justification is merely a pretext for
discrimination." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978); see also
Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05 (giving examples of
facts that prove or disprove pretext); Sullivan, supra note 12, § 1.5, at 59 (pretext means
conduct not justified by reasonable business necessity).
46. See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of the Director 140 (1985) (8,082 out of 118,833 statutory actions filed in federal district courts in
the twelve months ending June 30, 1985 were employment discrimination cases). Judge
Richard Posner noted that "[i]n the year ending June 30, 1986, more than 9,000 suits
charging employment discrimination, the vast majority under Title VII, were brought in
federal court." Posner, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. Pa. L. Rev.
513, 514 (1987).
47. See Brief for Petitioner Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. at 50, United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (No. 78-435).
48. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 230-32 (5th Cir.
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Such plans, however, are subject to Title VII challenges by the employees
or applicants, typically white males, who are disadvantaged by them.4 9
Because the plans necessarily contain explicit race or gender preferences,
these plaintiffs have little problem establishing a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Once such a case has been established, the employer
has the burden of justifying the discriminatory treatment.so At this
point, he must demonstrate that he instituted the plan in response to the
appropriate finding of past discrimination or current imbalance. 5
The Supreme Court addressed voluntary affirmative action plans for
the first time in United Steelworkers v. Weber.5 2 The plan at issue in
Weber was intended to remedy a racial imbalance in the skilled-craft

workforce of Kaiser Aluminum's Gramercy, Louisiana plant.5

Prior to

1974, only 1.83% of the plant's skilled craft workers were black.'

In

contrast, the local workforce was 39% black. 5 The imbalance resulted

from Kaiser's policy of hiring only craft workers with prior experience

and from the historic exclusion of blacks from craft unions in the area,

making it impossible for them to get the experience they needed. 6 Under
pressure from both the federal government and private civil rights
groups,5 7 the United Steelworkers and Kaiser agreed to institute a training program that would supply the plant's new craft workers.5 8 The plan

mandated that at least 50% of the trainees be black.5 9 A class of white

1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979); Brief for Amicus Curiae Equal Employment Advisory Council at 22-23,
United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979) (No. 78-432).
49. See e.g., United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 199 (1979). Until McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976), it was unclear whether
Title VII prohibited discrimination against white males. In McDonald, three employees,
two whites and one black, were caught stealing company property. See i at 276. The
company fired the whites and retained the black, seemingly using race as the sole basis for
the decision. The Court held that this violated Title VII, as Congress intended the statute
to bar all discrimination. See id at 280.
50. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. CL 1442, 1449 (1987); supra note
45.
51. See Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1449-52.
52. 443 U.S. 193 (1979); see also Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 883 (6th
Cir. 1983) (calling Weber the seminal Title VII case), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
Weber explicitly limited its holding to private employers. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 200.
The Court later extended its holding to public employers. See Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1449
n.6. This extension corresponds to the legislative history of the EEOA, in which Congress extended the provisions of Title VII, without altering them, to public employers.
See supra note 13.
53. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 198.
54. See hi. at 198 (5 out of 273).
55. See id at 199.
56. See id at 198.
57. See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 228-29 (5th Cir.
1977) (Wisdom, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193 (1979).
58. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 199.
59. See id
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workers sued under Title VII. 6°
Because the Weber Court held that Title VII allows private employers
"to adopt affirmative action plans designed to eliminate conspicuous racial imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories ' 6 I as long as
such plans do not "unnecessarily trammel the interests of the white employees, "62 it found the Kaiser plan permissible. The Court declined,
however, to establish a more specific standard separating permissible
from impermissible plans.6 3
The Weber majority faced a formidable hurdle to its holding since the
plain meaning of Title VII appears to forbid all discrimination, whatever
the form. 4 In addition, the legislative history of Title VII contains much
60. See id.
61. Id. at 209. This test was later termed the "manifest imbalance" standard. See
Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1452 (1987).
The court of appeals had found the Weber plan discriminatory in violation of Title VII.
See Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 563 F.2d 216, 227 (5th Cir. 1977),
holding that only a prior judicial determination of discrimination could justify reverse
discrimination by an employer, see id. at 223-24. The Supreme Court reversed, noting
that the lower court analysis would make voluntary compliance with Title VII difficult.
See Weber, 443 U.S. at 207.
62. Weber, 443 U.S. at 208. The Supreme Court consistently has held that voluntary
affirmative action plans by public or private employers should be analyzed under the
same basic two-pronged test, whether attacked on Title VII or equal protection grounds.
See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1452 (1987); Wygant v. Jackson
Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274 (1986); Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
The first prong, broadly, requires that the employer make a sufficient factual showing
to justify his plan. See Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1452. This is satisfied, at a minimum, by a
current manifest imbalance, but may require actual past discrimination by the employer.
Compare Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1455 (given manifest gender imbalance in job category,
consideration by employer of gender as one factor in promotion was reasonable) with
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (racial classification requires "some showing of prior discrimination").
If the plan passes this first prong, the second prong requires that the plan be "narrowly
tailored to the achievement of [the] goal." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 274 (quoting Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980)); see also Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1455-56 (referring to
the second prong test as requiring that the plan not "unnecessarily trammel[']" the interests of innocent white or male employees). While most courts appear to agree that the
equal protection and Title VII standards for the first prong do not coincide, see infra note
123 and accompanying text, some imply that no such distinction exists under the second
prong. See Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
The factors that help a plan pass the second prong include: that it consist of a preference, not a quota, see Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1455; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438
U.S. 265, 318 (1978); that it harm innocent employees as little as possible, compare Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1456 (allowing promotions) and United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443
U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (allowing hiring) with Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-84 (forbidding layoffs); that it help attain, not maintain, a racial or sexual balance, see Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at
1456; Weber, 443 U.S. at 208; and that it be of limited duration, see Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at
1456; Weber, 443 U.S. at 208-09.
63. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 208.
64. See supra note 37 (text of § 703(a)). In addition to § 703(a), the Weber plan was
subject to the provisions of § 703(d), which states that "[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for any employer [or] labor organization... to discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin in admission to, or
employment in, any program established to provide apprenticeship or other training." 42
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evidence that Congress did not intend the law to be a vehicle for raceconscious employment practices." The majority overcame this hurdle in
two ways.
First, while acknowledging that the plain language of the statute indeed appears to bar affirmative action," the Court held that the plan in
question was in keeping with Title VII's spirit-a desire to integrate
blacks into the mainstream of American society,67 rather than to leave
them trapped in the pattern of discrimination that Title VII had declared
illegal.6" The majority found further support for this justification in the
express congressional desire to encourage voluntary compliance69 and to
minimize interference in "traditional management prerogatives." 70

Second, the majority relied on the language of section 703(j), which
bars courts from using Title VII to require preferential treatment to corU.S.C. § 2000e-2(d) (1982). According to the Weber dissent, these provisions clearly
"prohibit racial discrimination in employment simpliciter." Weber, 443 U.S. at 220
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
65. See 110 Cong. Rec. 6564 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Kuchel, Senate sponsor) (under
Title VII, "[e]mployers and labor organizations could not discriminate in favor of or
against a person because of his race, his religion, or his national origin"); id at 7213
(remarks of Sens. Clark and Case, Senate floor managers of the bill) ("[an employer]
would not be obliged-or indeed permitted... to prefer Negroes for future vacancies");
id. at 11,848 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey, Senate leader of Title VII House-Senate conference committee) ("The title does not provide that any preferential treatment in employment shall be given to Negroes or to any other persons or groups."); see also Weber, 443
U.S. at 230-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the legislative history of Title VII
proved that the Act barred plan at issue).
66. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 201.
67. See id. at 202. The majority quoted numerous passages from the Congressional
Record to the effect that the goal of Title VII was to improve "the plight of the Negro in
our economy." Weber, 443 U.S. at 202 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6548 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Humphrey)). See, eg., id. at 203 (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 6547 (1964) (remarks of
Sen. Humphrey)) ("What good does it do a Negro to be able to eat in a fine restaurant if
he cannot afford to pay the bill?"); iL (quoting 109 Cong. Rec. 11,159 (1963) (remarks of
Pres. Kennedy) (statement urging acceptance of bill that later became Title VII)) ("There
is little value in a Negro's obtaining the right to be admitted to hotels and restaurants if
he has no cash in his pocket and no job.").
The Weber Court failed to cite the only piece of Title VII's legislative history that
directly supports its approach. A report from Senators Clark and Case, the floor managers of the bill in the Senate, states: "An antidiscrimination law cannot be evaluated simply by an examination of its provisions, 'for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.'"
110 Cong. Rec. 7214 (1964) (citation omitted in original).
68. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 204 ("It would be ironic indeed if a law triggered by a
Nation's concern over centuries of racial injustice... constituted the first legislative
prohibition of all voluntary, private, race-conscious efforts to abolish traditional patterns
of racial segregation and hierarchy."). Justice Blackmiun noted that the legislative history
of Title VII contains no compelling evidence of the desire to "lock-in" segregative results
that were legal prior to the passage of the law. See id. at 215 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
69. See id. at 204 ("national leadership provided by the enactment of Federal legislation dealing with the most troublesome problems will create an atmosphere conducive to
voluntary or local resolution of otherforms of discrimination")(quoting H.R. Rep. No.

914, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1963)) (emphasis added in Weber).
70. See id. at 207.
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rect a racial or gender imbalance.7 1 Because that section speaks of not
requiring preferential treatment, the Court held it could not be read as
prohibiting such treatment.72 In addition, because the section's prohibition speaks to the courts, not to employers, the majority's reading of secintended to
tion 7030) also fits neatly with its holding that Congress
73
interfere with employers' rights as little as possible.
The Weber Court left unresolved the question whether the manifest
imbalance in traditionally segregated job categories standard required
merely a showing of a current imbalance or proof that the "traditional
segregation" alleged of the employer in question was created by his own,
or his predecessors' past discrimination.74 In Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 75 the Court answered this question by holding that Title VII ex71. Section 7030) states:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require any employer... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual or
group on account of an imbalance which may exist with respect to the total
number or percentage of persons of any race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin employed by any employer ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1982) (emphasis added). See Weber, 443 U.S. at 205 n.5.
72. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 205.
73. See id. at 206; Sullivan, supra note 12, § 13.4, at 829.
74. See generally Comment, supra note 24, at 474-75. Justice Blackmun stated that
the majority's standard was broader than absolutely necessary to achieve its aims. See
Weber, 443 U.S. at 212-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Blackmun noted the employer's
dilemma: "If Title VII is read literally, on the one hand [employers] face liability for past
discrimination against blacks, and on the other they face liability to whites for any voluntary preferences adopted to mitigate the effects of prior discrimination against blacks."
Id. at 210. The solution, he argued, would be to allow employers to adopt Weber-type
plans if they could show a past "arguable violation" of Title VII in discriminating against
women or minorities. See id. at 211.
By this "arguable violation" standard, Justice Blackmun meant that Title VII, in effect,
empowered employers to make out a statistical prima facie disparate impact case against
themselves and to remedy it by voluntary affirmative action. See id. at 214 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). An employer could use the same statistics a plaintiff would use against the
employer to establish a prima facie case. See id. at 213; supra note 44. This standard, he
argued, had the dual benefit of upholding the congressional desire that Title VII disputes
be resolved voluntarily and of limiting employers to remedying imbalances arguably of
their own making, thus preventing them from correcting mere societal discrimination.
See id. at 212-13.
75. 107 S. Ct. 1442 (1987). In Johnson, the respondent promoted a woman to the
position of road dispatcher, a skilled job that previously had been held exclusively by
men. See id. at 1445-46. The woman was one of seven qualified applicants, but she had
scored slightly lower on an eligibility test than the petitioner, a white male. See id. at
1448. Despite the difference, she received the promotion pursuant to the agency's affirmative action plan. See id.
Looking at the agency's plan in light of the Weber requirements, the Supreme Court
found the plan was justified by the manifest imbalance between the number of female
skilled craft workers and the percentage of women in the relevant local workforce. See id.
at 1454. Out of 238 skilled craft workers, none were women. See id. at 1446. This
"inexorable zero," see id. at 1465 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 342 n.23 (1977)), meant
that regardless of whether the majority adopted the agency's long-term goal of matching
the number of women in the county-wide workforce (36%), as it appeared to do, see id. at
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pressed the congressional intent that a current manifest imbalance be sufficient to justify a narrowly tailored plan.7 6 While this holding made the
employer's practical responsibility clear, on a more abstract level the
Court failed to establish whether it considered an imbalance remediable
per se or simply the basis for a reasonable inference of past discrimination.77 Subsequent lower court cases interpreting Johnson have disagreed
on this issue.78
Despite this dispute over the meaning of the Title VII manifest imbal-

ance standard after Johnson, this standard is a model of clarity compared
to that of the equal protection clause.
II.

EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARDS

The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment assures all
individuals of "equal protection of the laws."' 79 Given this vague and
sweeping language, it is not surprising that a basic and longstanding conflict continues over the clause's interpretation. On the one hand, some
believe the equal protection clause is color blind, barring all discrimina-

tion within its scope.8 0 On the other hand, others believe it is color conscious, barring invidious discrimination but allowing, under certain
1446, or limited the agency to matching the percentage of skilled female craftworkers in
the area (5%), see id at 1465 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), it found an
imbalance sufficient to justify the plan.
76. See id at 1452.
77. See Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 85-87 (Silberman, J., concurring) (D.C. Cir.
1987).
The distinction between viewing a manifest imbalance as evidence of past discrimination or as a wrong remediable of itself could be significant. This is true because despite
Johnson'srejection, in dictum, of the prima facie standard, see Johnson, 107 S. Ct at 1452
n.10, focus on a manifest imbalance as a vestige of discrimination may well achieve the
same result as the prima facie standard, which also uses statistics to show arguable past
discrimination. See id at 1462-63 (O'Connor, J.,concurring in the judgment); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 212-14 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
O'Connor read Weber as permitting affirmative action "only as a remedial device to eliminate actual or apparent discrimination or the lingering effects of this discrimination."
Johnson, 107 S.Ct. at 1461. In this light, it is hard to see the difference between the
majority holding and Justice O'Connor's concurrence. See supra note 75.
78. CompareHammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 80-81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (manifest imbalance must show "predicate of discrimination") with Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d
351, 356 (9th Cir. 1987) (the imbalance alone justifies the remedy).
79. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Rotunda, Nowak & Young state that the framers
of the fourteenth amendment had four general goals: to guarantee certain civil liberties
against state action; to apply these liberties equally to all citizens, regardless of race; to
give Congress wide power to enforce the amendment, and expand civil rights; and, to
make the federal government the ultimate guarantor of individual civil rights. These four
aspects were intended to, and did, alter the existing balance of federalism. See Rotunda,
supra note 17, § 18.7, at 378-79.
80. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 522-23 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Schiff, Reverse Discrimination Re-Defined as Equal Protection: The Orwellian
Nightmare in the Enforcement of Civil Rights Laws, 8 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 627, 628
(1985).
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circumstances, "benign" discrimination such as affirmative action. 8'
A majority of the Supreme Court, to one extent or another, supports
the color conscious view as applied to affirmative action. 2 Although the
Court has reached a minimal consensus that some kind of affirmative
action is constitutional,8 3 it remains divided over what kinds of plans
satisfy the equal protection clause.8 4 Thus, the Court has failed to produce a single majority opinion in the three major affirmative action cases
81. See, eg., L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 16-22, at 1521 (2d ed. 1988)
("Despite the suggestion that our Constitution should be 'colorblind,' it has long been
recognized that this is a misleading metaphor." (footnote omitted)).
This conflict dates back as least as far as Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). In
Plessy, the Court held that "equal protection of the laws" did not mean equal social
protection. Therefore, discrimination in school, public accommodations, and the like, was
constitutional. See id. at 544-45. But see Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494-95
(1954) (implicitly overruling Plessy's "separate but equal" doctrine). Justice Harlan, in
dissent, rejected this argument, stating: "Our Constitution is color-blind .... In respect
of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law." See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan,
J., dissenting). Almost one hundred years later, opponents of affirmative action use Justice Harlan's dissent to justify their argument. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 522-23 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
The proponents of affirmative action take a more complex approach. While recognizing that "[o]ur Nation was founded on the principle that 'all Men are created equal,'"
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 326 (1978) (Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part), they add that "we cannot
... let color blindness become myopia which masks the reality that many 'created equal'
have been treated within our lifetimes as inferior both by the law and by their fellow
citizens." Id. at 327. Under this view, then, the proper distinction lies between racial
preferences that correct inequality, and those that maintain or aggravate it. See id. at 407
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
82. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 280 (1986); id. at 286
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); id. at 302 (Marshall,
J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor, in an unsuccessful attempt to forge an opinion of the
Court on the issue, noted that "[t]he Court is in agreement that, whatever the formulation employed, remedying past or present racial discrimination by a state actor is a sufficiently weighty state interest to warrant the remedial use of a carefully constructed
affirmative action program." Wygant, 476 U.S. at 286 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
83. See supra note 82.
84. Compare Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302 (opinion of Powell, J.) (preferential classifications require past statutory or constitutional violations) and Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 497
(Powell, J., concurring) (same) with Bakke, 438 U.S. at 364 (Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("requirement of a judicial
determination of a constitutional or statutory violation as a predicate for race-conscious
remedial actions would be self-defeating"). This inability to agree means observers must
look to past cases and the predelictions of justices to predict the future. See generally
Choper, Continued Uncertaintyas to the Constitutionalityof Remedial Racial Classifications: Identifying Piecesof the Puzzle, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 255, 271-74 (1987) (analyzing the

views of individual justices). In this context, the views of the newest Supreme Court
Justice, Anthony Kennedy, are of vital importance to the future of affirmative action.
Unfortunately, Justice Kennedy does not appear to have written a single opinion on this
issue in his twelve years on the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He
has, however, indicated in broad terms his support for voluntary affirmative action. At
the confirmation hearings, Senator Biden asked then Judge Kennedy: "Do you think that
voluntary plans by employers, voluntary affirmative action plans, are permissible?" N.Y.
Times, Dec. 16, 1987, at B5, col. 6. Judge Kennedy answered: "Yes." Id.
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it has decided, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 5 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 86 and Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education.s7
A. Early Cases: Regents of the University of California v. Bakke and
Fullilove v. Klutznick
Neither Bakke nor Fullilove deal directly with voluntary affirmative
action by employers. The respondent in Bakke challenged the legality of
a medical school admissions plan that set aside sixteen of one hundred
places for minority students. 8 The Court held the plan illegal, 9 but also

held that some affirmative action was constitutional. 9 In Fullilove, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of the Public Works Employment Act

of 1977 ("PWEA"), which set aside ten percent of certain federal construction funds for minority business enterprises. 9 1
Bakke and Fullilove demonstrate three distinct positions on the
Court. 92 The conservative position maintains that voluntary affirmative
action violates the Constitution.93 The liberal view is equally consistent,

approving affirmative action in every case that has come before the
Court. 94 The moderate position requires evidence of past discrimination

85. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
86. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
87. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
88. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 275.
89. See id at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.); id at 421 (opinion of Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
90. See id. at 315-19 (opinion of Powell, J.); id at 378-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun, JI., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
91. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980); id at 496 (Powell, J., concurring); id at 517 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 6705(f)(2) (1982).
92. See Choper, supra note 84, at 260-62.
93. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 525 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Under this view, race- or sex-conscious action is permissible only to benefit identifiable
victims of discrimination by the employer in question. See Choper, supra note 84, at 27273.
Technically, the four justices who supported this position in Bakke did not reach the
constitutional question. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 411-12
(1978) (Stevens, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and Stewart and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). They argued that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-6 (1982), which governs all federally-funded programs, constitutes an independent ban on race-conscious affirmative action. See id. at 413-14 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). There is little question that they
considered race-conscious affirmative action unconstitutional as well. See id. at 416
("The Act's proponents plainly considered Title VI consistent with their view or the Constitution and they sought to provide an effective weapon to implement that view.").
The two justices taking the conservative position reacted even more emphatically when
faced with the 10% congressional set-aside in Fullilove. They stated that any legislative
race-conscious action was unconstitutional per se. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S.
448, 532 (1980) (Stewart, ., joined by Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("under the Constitution
... one practice in which government may never engage is the practice of racism-not
even 'temporarily' and not even as an 'experiment' ").
94. See Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 519 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgmenty, Bakke,
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but allows affirmative action that is not victim-specific. 95 The moderate
438 U.S. at 362 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Choper, supra note 84, at 267.
The four justices who would have upheld the plan in Bakke believed the traditional
strict scrutiny standard inappropriate for cases of benign discrimination, such as Bakke.
See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 356-62 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). See infra note 101 (discussion of strict scrutiny). Instead,
they advocated borrowing a standard that the Court previously had applied to state laws
burdening individuals on the basis of gender or illegitimacy, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 36061 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). This standard required the plan to be substantially related to an important state
interest. See id. at 359 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Observers have termed this standard "intermediate scrutiny" of
state governmental action. See Rotunda, supra note 17, § 18.3, at 326. The four justices
taking the liberal view in Bakke argued that a quota designed to alleviate societal discrimination met the intermediate scrutiny criteria. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 378-79. See generally Choper, The Constitutionalityof Affirmative Action: Views From the Supreme Court,
70 Ky. L.J. 1, 1-4 (1981-82) (comparing Powell's and Brennan's views in Bakke).
Three justices, Brennan, Blackmun and Marshall, simply applied their Bakke analysis
to the statute at issue in Fullilove. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 519 (1980)
(Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment). They
saw little difference between the 16% quota in Bakke and the 10% quota imposed by the
PWEA, see id. at 517-18 & n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment), and considered
it substantially irrelevant that one plan was enacted by Congress and the other by a state
Board of Regents. See id. at 517 n.2; see also Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608
F.2d 671, 694 (6th Cir. 1979) (adopting the intermediate scrutiny standard), cert. denied,
452 U.S. 938 (1981); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 885-86 (6th Cir. 1983)
(same), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984).
95. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490; Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,
320 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.). Victim-specific relief is that which is limited to the
identifiable victims of discriminatory practices. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747, 777-80 (1976). Affirmative action focuses not on identifiable victims of
discrimination, but on remedying a manifest imbalance or other residual effects of past
discrimination. See Lee, Missing Pieces: A Commentary on Choper, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 275,
277-78 (1987). The Supreme Court holds that court-ordered relief must be more limited
in the absence of identifiable victims. See Firefighters Local No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S
561, 578-79 (1984).
In Bakke, Justice Powell's opinion represented the moderate view. He found the medical school's 16% quota unconstitutional, forming a majority with those justices who
found the plan invalid under Title VI. See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320 (opinion of Powell, J.);
supra note 89 and accompanying text. In his view, the medical school, which had justified the quota as a way of correcting past societal discrimination, see Bakke, 438 U.S. at
307 (opinion of Powell, J.), lacked the compelling justification that the Court required
from all racial classifications under the traditional "strict scrutiny" standard. See id. at
299 (opinion of Powell, J.); infra note 101 (discussion of strict scrutiny).
Justice Powell speculated, however, that the plan would have survived strict scrutiny
had the school's goal been diversity in the student body, because then the school would
have been correcting its own wrong, not that of society, see id. at 311-13, and had the
plan used a "plus" system-one in which race constituted one of many factors-instead
of a rigid quota. See id. at 317-18.
The Fullilove plurality, authored by Chief Justice Burger, with Justices White and
Powell concurring, in upholding the statute, relied on the broad power of Congress to
enforce the equal protection clause. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 483-84; infra notes 155-60
and accompanying text. That power appeared to lower the proper level of judicial scrutiny for an act of Congress, even when the act included racial classifications. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 477, 480, 491 (standard should be "searching examination" instead of
strict scrutiny). This "searching examination" allowed a 10% quota, at least a flexible
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position, represented by the opinion of Justice Powell in Bakke and by
the plurality in Fulliove,9 6 prevailed in both cases, as well as in the
Court's most recent affirmative action case, Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education.97
B.

Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education

In Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education,9 8 the Court finally addressed an equal protection challenge to a public employer's voluntary
affirmative action plan. 99 The Court held the race-conscious layoff provision of a school hiring and promotion plan unconstitutional."c Apply-

ing the strict scrutiny standard, 1 ' the plurality rejected the school

board's reliance on an imbalance between the percentage of minority students and minority teachers to justify the plan.'0 2
The school board in Wygant denied any discrimination in its hiring

policies1" 3 and offered no proof of an imbalance similar to those that had
one that could be waived if impractical; for example, if there were no minority contractors in a given region. See id. at 487-89.
Justice Powell, concurring with the plurality, adhered to his strict scrutiny standard,
but he stated that it was met by the special competence of Congress to alleviate discrimination and by the flexibility of the set-aside. See id at 502 (Powell, J., concurring). He
contrasted both factors with the limited competence of the Board of Regents and rigid
quota in Bakke. See id at 498. While Justice Powell restated his view that a valid plan
must remedy a past statutory or constitutional violation, see id.; Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.), he added that Congress, unlike the Board of Regents, need
not make a detailed finding of such violations, but merely state their occurrence. See
Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 502-04 (Powell, J., concurring). In fact, the PWEA 10% provision
had been passed as a floor amendment to another bill, with no factual findings and little
debate. See id at 549-50 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
96. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453 (plurality); Bakke, 438 U.S. at 271-72 (opinion of
Powell, J.).
97. 476 U.S. 267, 269 (1986).
98. 476 U.S. 267 (1986).
99. See id at 273; Comment, Principlesof Competence: The Ability of Public Institutions to Adopt Remedial Affirmative Action Plans, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 581, 585 (1986).
100. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 283-84. The plan, agreed to by the teachers' union and
the school board, stipulated that in the event of layoffs, the racial composition of the
teachers laid offwould mirror the existing racial composition of the teaching staff; regardless of the fact that black teachers with less seniority would be retained over white teachers with more seniority. See id at 270-71.
101. See id. at 279-80. Under the strict scrutiny standard, a statute "would be upheld
only if the state were able to show an overriding purpose requiring proscription of the
specified conduct when engaged in by members of different races but not when engaged in
by persons of the same race." Rotunda, supra note 17, § 18.8, at 401; sea eg., Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (invalidating state anti-miscegenation law); McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 194 (1964) (invalidating state law forbidding interracial sexual
intercourse outside marriage). See generally Rotunda, supra note 17, § 18.3, at 324-25
(Supreme Court will apply strict scrutiny to any law affecting fundamental rights,
whether challenge is brought on due process or equal protection grounds); 3 R. Rotunda,
J. Nowak & J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure
§ 20.11, at 44 (1986) (all state laws impairing first amendment rights are subject to strict
judicial scrutiny).
102. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 275-76 (1986).
103. See id. at 271-72. The school board raised the possibility of its own prior discrim-
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justified the Johnson and Weber plans." 4 The board instead justified the
layoffs by asserting the need to provide "role models" for black students,105 hoping that correcting the imbalance between the percentage of
black teachers and black students would improve the students' self-image.10 6 The Court ruled that the student-teacher imbalance evinced societal discrimination, not the board's own past discrimination, and
therefore was not remediable by affirmative action. 10 7 This holding is
consistent with the pluralities of Bakke and Fullilove, which suggest that
local bodies, unlike Congress, are incompetent to correct societal
discrimination. 10 8
Despite reaffirming the application of strict scrutiny to affirmative action, Wygant appears to lower the degree of discrimination an employer
must show to justify his plan. Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and his
concurrence with the plurality in Fulliove require a finding of discrimination reaching the level of a statutory or constitutional violation. °9 In
Wygant, Justice Powell, again writing for the plurality, apparently modified the requirement to "a strong basis in evidence" that there had been
ination for the first time in its Supreme Court brief. The Court refused to consider the
argument, or even to remand the case based on this new argument. See id. at 277-78 &
n.5.
104. See i. at 292-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1446 (1987) (comparing percentages of female skilled craft workers and women in general workforce); United
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 198-99 (1979) (comparing percentages of black
skilled craft workers and blacks in the general workforce).
105. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 272.
106. See id; see also Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action
Cases, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 78, 96 (1986) (arguing that the Wygant plan, motivated by the
desire to improve the town's quality of education "whether by improving black students'
performance or by dispelling ... any idea that white supremacy governs our social institutions" did not violate the equal protection clause).
107. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276. The explicit rejection of societal discrimination as a
remediable wrong may not command a majority of the Court. Justice O'Connor joined
the plurality on this point, see id. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment), but Justice White, the other concurring vote, did not. See id. at 294-95
(White, J., concurring in the judgment). Therefore, while two courts of appeals have read
Wygant as banning the societal discrimination approach per se, see J.A. Croson Co. v.
City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1357 (4th Cir. 1987), prob.juris noted, 108 S. Ct. 1010
(1988); Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 819 F.2d 766, 768-69 (7th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 288 (1987), room for disagreement exists. See Croson,
822 F.2d at 1362 n.3 (Sprouse, J., dissenting); Britton, 819 F.2d at 779 (Cudahy, J.,
dissenting).
108. See supra note 95. There was no conservative view in Wygant. The justices taking the conservative view in Bakke and Fulliove, most notably Justice Rehnquist, joined
the plurality. There is little doubt, however, that such a view still exists. See Johnson v.
Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1469-70 (1987) (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist,
C.J. and White, J., dissenting) (implying that the Constitution, as well as Title VII, forbade the agency's plan); Choper, supra note 84, at 272-73 ("Even though he joined Justice
Powell's opinion in Wygant, the reasoning (but not the result) of which goes further [than
Rehnquist's earlier position], all indications suggest that Justice Rehnquist would subsequently disclaim that broad language. .. ").
109. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 498 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
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discrimination in the past.110
Because the facts of Wygant concern layoffs,"' lower courts attempting to apply its legal analysis to the more common problem of affmative
action in hiring and promotion, or to any other affirmative action challenged under the equal protection clause, have reached inconsistent results.' 2 In Wygant, the Supreme Court once again failed to establish a
majority view on exactly what proof of discrimination the equal protec110. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986). While Justice
Powell failed to define this standard further, Justice O'Connor, purporting to concur fully
with the plurality's standard, attempted to clarify it. She argued, as had Justice Blackmun in Weber, see supra note 74, that an employer's introduction of prima facie evidence
of a Title VII disparate impact violation, see supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text,
should suffice to shield the plan from constitutional attack. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 292
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). She based this argument in part on the belief that a higher standard of proof "would severely undermine
public employers' incentive to meet voluntarily their civil rights obligations." See iL at
290 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); see also Youngblood v. Dalzell, 804 F.2d 360, 365 (6th Cir. 1986) (appearing to apply Justice
O'Connor's standard by upholding a plan implemented pursuant to a statistical showing
of a pattern of discrimination), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 1576 (1987).
111. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282. Layoffs fall under the second prong of the affirmative action analysis-the "narrowly tailored" or "no unnecessary trammeling" requirement. See supra note 62. Layoffs, the plurality held, disrupt the lives of those affected to
such a great extent that they could never be part of a valid affirmative action plan. See
Wygant, 476 U.S. at 282-84. A worker has a greater property interest in keeping a job he
or she already has than in getting a job to which he or she aspires. See id. at 283. Only
four justices, however, stated that layoffs were the fatal flaw in the plan. See id. at 284
(opinion of Powell, J., joined by Burger, CJ., and Rehnquist, J.); id at 294-95 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment). Justice O'Connor might allow layoffs under certain circumstances. See id at 293-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
112. Compare Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 357-60 (9th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing Wygant and relying on Weber and Johnson to uphold the constitutionality of a
promotion plan adopted in response to a manifest imbalance) and Youngblood v. Dalzell,
804 F.2d 360, 364-65 (6th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing Wygant and instead relying on
Weber to uphold promotion plan), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct 1576 (1987) with Ledoux v.
District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1305-06 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (relying on Wy gant, court
remanded equal protection challenge to promotion plan because district court had relied
solely on manifest imbalance to permit plan).
The legality of legislative set-asides of state money to businesses owned by minorities or
women is another common affirmative action issue. Fullilove v. Klutznick resolved the
issue on the federal level, see supra note 91 and accompanying text, but not at the state
level. Three courts of appeals have attempted to apply the Wygant "strict scrutiny" test
to such set-asides and have reached varying results. See Michigan Road Builders Ass'n v.
Milliken, 834 F.2d 583, 584, 588 (6th Cir. 1987) (relying on Wygant to reject a Michigan
set-aside of 7% to minority-owned businesses and 5% to woman-owned businesses);
H.K. Porter Co. v. Metropolitan Dade County, 825 F.2d 324, 329-32 (1 1th Cir. 1987)
(per curiam) (relying on Fullilove's mandate, court approved local 5% set-aside for minority construction companies); J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355,
1357-60 (4th Cir. 1987) (distinguishing Fullilove as applicable only to federal action,
court relied on Wygant to hold a 30% local set-aside unconstitutional), prob.juris noted,
108 S. CL 1010 (1988); see also Comment, supra note 99, at 613-16 (discussing the appropriate amount of deference courts should give state and local legislatures and administrative agencies).
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tion clause requires of an employer to justify a plan."' As a result, the

case suffers from major flaws as a precedent for challenges to voluntary
hiring and promotion plans on equal protection grounds.

III.
A.

THE DISPARITY BETWEEN TITLE VII AND
EQUAL PROTECTION STANDARDS

The Lower Courts: Confusion Rampant

The Supreme Court has not yet analyzed an affirmative action plan
under both the Title VII and the equal protection standards. Since plaintiffs can raise both issues in the same case, lower courts have been left to
resolve such challenges without proper Supreme Court guidance. 14
Three lower court cases decided after Wygant and Johnson indicate that
the combination of those Supreme Court opinions has given lower courts

insufficient direction. Given similar manifest imbalances and little other

evidence of discrimination, these cases, Higgins v. City of Vallejo,' 15 Ledoux v. District of Columbia," 6 and Hammon v. Barry,117 reach three
different conclusions. The Higgins court held the plan before it valid
under both the Title VII and equal protection standards. " 8 The Ledoux
court held its plan valid under Title VII, but remanded on the constitutional question." 9 The Hammon court refused even to find a manifest
113. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 284-85 (1986) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Choper, supra note 84, at 259.
114. See Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 775 F.2d 794, 809 (7th Cir.
1985) ("the Court's opinions do not provide the kind of guidance in the constitutional
area that its decision in Weber does in analyzing Title VII challenges"), rev'd on other
grounds, 819 F.2d 766 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 288 (1987); Kromnick
v. School Dist., 739 F.2d 894, 901 (3d Cir. 1984) ("The absence of an Opinion of the
Court in either Bakke or Fulliove ... makes the position of the lower federal courts
considering the constitutionality of affirmative action programs somewhat vulnerable."),
cert denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985); Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704 F.2d 878, 885 (6th Cir.
1983) ("The Supreme Court has not provided the kind of guidance in the constitutional
context that Weber affords under Title VII."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984). For
other lower court cases that have faced both Title VII and equal protection challenges to
voluntary public affirmative action plans, see Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend,
836 F.2d 1034, 1040 (7th Cir. 1987); Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(Silberman, J., concurring); Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 358 (9th Cir. 1987);
Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
115. 823 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1987).
116. 820 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
117. 826 F.2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
118. See Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351, 358-60 (9th Cir. 1987). The Higgins
court held that a manifest imbalance between the city government workforce (11.4%
minority and 7.3% black) and the city's population (30% minority and 17% black), see
Higgins, 823 F.2d at 356, provided a sufficient showing to grant summary judgment in
favor of the city on both the Title VII, see id., and constitutional issues, see id. at 360.
The Higgins court found that the racial imbalance offered "abundant evidence" of past
discrimination, id. at 358, and that the promotion made pursuant to such evidence "satisfies even the most rigorous equal protection requirements," id. Thus, the court, in effect,
allowed the manifest imbalance standard to govern the constitutional claim.
119. See Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1305-07 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Ledoux ruled on a promotion plan set up by the District of Columbia Police Department
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imbalance, 2 ° but indicated in dictum that it would limit affirmative
ac2
tion to intentional past discrimination, even under Title VII.'
Earlier lower court cases that address both Title VII and the equal
protection clause appear to fall into three camps. One view recognizes
the disparity and, concluding that the stricter equal protection standard
ultimately will govern, subsumes the Title VII standard into its equal
protection analysis.' 22 A more common view sees the standards as distinct, the equal protection standard being stricter, but no court subscribing to this view has yet found a plan valid under Title VII and invalid
under equal protection. 123 Discussing this apparent disparity between
that was designed to remedy racial and sexual imbalances in upper-level positions. See
Ledoux, 820 F.2d at 1296. The D.C. workforce was 60% black, yet out of 549 sergeants,
for example, only 131 were black and 5 were women. See id at 1298 n.12. Similarly, out
of 171 lieutenants, only 30 were black and one was a woman. See id at 1298 & n.12. The
Ledoux court held that the imbalance shielded the plan from Title VII liability. See id at
1305. Unlike the Ninth Circuit in Higgins, 823 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1987); see supra note
118 (discussion of Higgins), however, the D.C. Circuit found the same imbalance unacceptable under the constitutional standard. See Ledoux, 820 F.2d at 1305-06. It remanded the case to the district court to find "something more," although it noted that
"this something more may be a greater quantum of statistical evidence." Id at 1306
(emphasis in original).
120. See Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 78 (D.C. Cir. 1987). The D.C. Fire Department sought to remedy the imbalance between the percentage of blacks on the force
(38%) and the percentage of blacks in the D.C. workforce (about 65%). See Hammon,
826 F.2d at 92 (Mikva, J., dissenting). Alternatively, the department sought to use as
comparison figures the percentage of blacks in the D.C. government (67.4%), see idiat 91
(Mikva, J., dissenting), or the percentage of blacks in the applicant pool (about 70%).
See id at 78. The Hammon court, however, relied on the percentage of blacks in the
Washington metropolitan area (29.3%), the area from which the fire department was
allowed to hire. See id., 826 F.2d at 77-78 & n.8. In contrast to the Hammon court, the
Ledoux court had used as its bench mark the percentage of blacks in the D.C. workforce.
See Ledoux, 820 F.2d at 1298 n. 12.
This difference between the two cases resulted in the success of the police department
plan in Ledoux, see Ledoux, 820 F.2d at 1304, and the failure of the fire department's
plan in Hammon, see Hammon, 826 F.2d at 78. While the Hammon court's use of the
metropolitan area figure technically may have been correct, it ignored the question why
two-thirds of the D.C. government workforce were black, but only about one-third of the
fire department, since the D.C government also hired from the metropolitan area. See id.
at 91 (Mikva, J., dissenting).
121. See Hammon, 826 F.2d at 80-81.
122. At least two courts have used this approach. See Bratton v. City of Detroit, 704
F.2d 878, 887 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); Jones v. Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Div., 642 F. Supp. 644, 656 (W.D. Tenn. 1986). In both cases, this
approach did not affect the outcome, as the courts found the plans valid under the stricter
test. See Bratton, 704 F.2d at 887 n.32; Jones, 642 F. Supp. at 663.
The Reagan administration takes a similar position, believing that the Supreme Court
intends Title VII analysis to apply only to private employers, and equal protection analysis only to public employers. See Address by William Bradford Reynolds, Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights, Bar Ass'n of the City of New York (Oct. 8, 1987) (tape
of speech available at Bar Association of the City of New York).
123. See, e.g., Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 836 F.2d 1034, 103942 (7th
Cir. 1987) (plan invalid under both Title VII and the equal protection clause); Hammon
v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 85 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Silberman, J., concurring) (same); Ledoux v.
District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (plan valid under Title VII,
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statutory and constitutional standards, a court of appeals judge stated:
"[a]lthough I readily concede that interpreting Title VII to permit per-

sonnel practices that the Constitution prohibits seems anomalous, the
[Supreme] Court has 124
nevertheless concluded that Congress intended just
that state of affairs."
In an attempt to resolve this anomaly, a third view tries to unify the
two standards. The most comprehensive attempt came in Kizas v. Webster.1 25 In Kizas, the court held that Title VII offered the sole remedy for
a federal employee claiming employment discrimination 26 and that the
failure to promote the plaintiffs did not violate the statute.1 27 The plaintiffs had argued that such a construction of Title VII failed to vindicate

their constitutional civil rights because "the Constitution's equal protection principle entails a stricter restraint on classification by race or sex
than does Title VII and would shelter them against 'reverse' discrimination that the statute may permit."1 28 The court rejected this argument,
stating that "[ilt suffices to point out that if the statute permitted discrimination in government employment that the Constitution prohibits, courts
would be obliged to hold the statute invalid to the extent it conflicted
with the superior norm."' 129 Because the Kizas court refused to hold the

statute unconstitutional, it found no conflict in upholding the Title VII

standard.' 3 0 Despite the efforts of the judges in Kizas and other cases to
rationalize the two standards,13 ' most courts, responding to what they
perceive to be a Supreme Court mandate, have treated them as disbut court could not "evaluate the legitimacy of the Plan under the Constitution"); Britton
v.South Bend Community School Corp., 775 F.2d 794, 809 (7th Cir. 1985) (plan valid
under both Title VII and the equal protection clause), rev'd on other grounds, 819 F.2d
766 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cerL denied, 108 S. Ct. 288 (1987); Kromnick v. School Dist.,
739 F.2d 894, 909 (3d Cir. 1984) (plan valid under both Title VII and the equal protection clause), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1107 (1985).
124. Hammon v. Barry, 826 F.2d 73, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Silberman, J., concurring).
Judge Silberman added that this anomaly could be resolved simply by viewing the manifest imbalance, as defined by Johnson, as evidence of past discrimination. See Hammon,
826 F.2d at 85-86 (Silberman, J., concurring).
125. 707 F.2d 524 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1042 (1984). In Kizas, the
white, male plaintiffs were passed over for promotion by the FBI and claimed discrimination. See Kizas, 707 F.2d at 532. They sued on both Title VII and equal protection
grounds. See iL
126. See id. at 542.
127. See id at 541.
128. Id at 542.
129. Id at 542-43 (emphasis in original).
130. See id at 543.
131. The court in Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 679 F.2d 965, 976 (1st Cir.
1982), vacated on other grounds sub nom., Boston Firefighters Union v. Boston Chapter,
NAACP, 461 U.S. 477 (1983), held that the Weber analysis guided employment discrimination claims brought on equal protection grounds under § 1983; see also Youngblood v.
Dalzell, 804 F.2d 360, 365 (6th Cir. 1986) ("the same basic considerations apply when a
race-counscious [sic] remedy is challenged under the Equal Protection Clause" or under
Title VII), cert. denied, 107 S.Ct. 1576 (1987); Setser v. Novack Inv. Co., 657 F.2d 962,
967-68 (8th Cir. 1981) (holding that Weber guided analysis of § 1981 (guaranteeing
equality of economic rights) claims as well).
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tinct.'3 2 The resulting confusion demonstrates that the Supreme Court
must clarify its mandate.
B.

The Disparity Resolved?

The resolution of the conflict between the equal protection clause and
Title VII' 3 3 as applied to voluntary public affirmative action plans lies in
two sources. The first is Title VII itself, or more precisely, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, which extends Title VII's provisions to public employers.' 34 The second is the enforcement clause ("section five") of the fourteenth amendment. 35 The EEOA demonstrates
the congressional intent that voluntary public affirmative action plans be
shielded from Title VII liability if they are instituted upon a finding of a
132. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
133. Under current Supreme Court analysis, the two standards may be easily reconcilable. Based on Johnson, there appear to be "five solid votes" (Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Stevens, Blackmun and O'Connor) for upholding a plan similar to the one in Johnson
against challenge on equal protection grounds. 56 U.S.L.W. 2238 (Oct. 27, 1987) (remarks of Professor Jesse Choper).
Such reconciliation would require adoption of the prima facie disparate impact standard. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. This standard was suggested first in
the Title VII context by Justice Blackmun, see United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S.
193, 212-14 (1979) (Blackmun, J., concurring), and later restated by Justice O'Connor in
both the Title VII, see Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1463 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), and constitutional contexts, see Wygant v.
Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 292 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment). She argued that the prima facie standard was applicable
equally in both contexts, noting that "[b]ecause both Wygant and Weber attempt to reconcile the same competing concerns, I see little justification for the adoption of different
standards for affirmative action under Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause." Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1463 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Two significant problems must be resolved, however, before courts can adopt the prima
facie standard under both the equal protection clause and Title VII. First, Justice
O'Connor appears to have been speaking only for herself; the plurality in Wygant did not
posit a clear equal protection standard, but only suggested that an employer could adopt
an affirmative action plan if he had a "strong basis in evidence" of past discrimination.
See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277. Second, the Johnson majority explicitly refused to adopt
the prima facie standard for affirmative action under Title VII, see Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at
1452 n.10, and stated that the prima facie and manifest imbalance standards are not
identical, see id. at 1449 n.6.
Assuming the viability of the prima facie standard, however, a resolution is possible
under existing analyses. The prima facie and manifest imbalance standards resemble one
another to a striking degree. First, the majority called the disparity in Johnson a manifest
imbalance, see id. at 1452, 1455, while Justice O'Connor called the same disparity prima
facie evidence of past discrimination. See id. at 1465 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment). More abstractly, the two standards may use identical means to reach the
same end. Each employs statistical evidence to validate affirmative action plans. Compare id at 1461 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (allowing statistics that prove
"actual or apparent discrimination, or the lingering effects of this discrimination") with
id at 1457 (employer may use manifest imbalance to justify an affirmative action plan
that will help to eliminate the "vestiges of discrimination in the workplace").
134. See supra note 13.
135. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 5 ("The Congress shall have power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.").
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manifest imbalance. 13 6 The EEOA was passed pursuant to the enforcement clause, 3 7 which gives Congress the power to define and expand the
equal protection standard.13 Thus, by passing the EEOA, Congress in-

tended that the Title VII standard define the equal protection standard.
1. Congressional Power Under the Enforcement Clause
A century of Supreme Court analysis demonstrates the unprecedented
constitutional power the enforcement clause gives Congress at the expense of the states. 1 39 The enforcement clause, however, goes further

than just subtracting from states' rights."

It also gives Congress a

voice in the definition of the individual rights covered by the fourteenth
amendment. In Katzenbach v. Morgan,' the Supreme Court elaborated
on both of these aspects of Congress' enforcement clause power.
Katzenbach held that Congress was within its constitutional authority

when it enacted section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 pursuant to

its enforcement clause power.142 Section 4(e) mandates that all citizens
with a sixth-grade education from any public school under United States

jurisdiction, including those, such as in Puerto Rico, that do not teach in
English, be eligible to vote in any American election. 43 This provision
directly contradicted a New York State statute that conditioned suffrage
upon literacy in English.'" Under the doctrine of federal preemption,

136. United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209 (1979), and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1452 (1987), make it clear that the manifest imbalance
standard guides judicial scrutiny of voluntary affirmative action plans under Title VII.
Title VII's provisions apply equally to all employers within its scope. See supra note 13.
137. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 453 n.9 (1976); S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 11 (1971); H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1971), reprinted in 1972
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2137, 2154; 118 Cong. Rec. 1816 (1972) (remarks of
Sen. Williams); 118 Cong. Rec. 1840 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Javits); see also Rotunda,
supra note 17, § 19.31, at 801 & n.4 (listing the extension of Title VII to state and local
governments as one example of Congress' use of § 5).
138. See infra notes 139-64 and accompanying text.
139. See Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-48 (1879). See generally Rotunda, supra
note 17, § 19.4, at 732 (discussing congressional enforcement clause power); Bohrer,
supra note 32, at 479-84 (1981) (analyzing the legislative history and early jurisprudence
of § 5). The Supreme Court has held:
There can be no doubt that this line of cases has sanctioned intrusions by Congress, acting under the Civil War Amendments, into the judicial, executive, and
legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States. The legislation considered in each case was grounded on the expansion of Congress' powers-with the corresponding diminution of state sovereignty... a phenomenon
aptly described as a "carv[ing] out."
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976) (quoting Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S.
339, 346 (1879)).
140. See infra note 151 and accompanying text.
141. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
142. See id. at 646 (upholding 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e) (Supp. 1 1965)).
143. See id. at 643.
144. See id. at 644 n.2. In fact, Congress passed § 4(e) specifically to enfranchise New
York's Puerto Rican population. See id. at 645 n.3.
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section 4(e) superceded the New York statute. 14
Comparison with an earlier case, Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board of Elections,14 demonstrates the significance of Katzenbach in the
Supreme Court's enforcement clause jurisprudence. In Lassiter, which
was decided before the passage of the Voting Rights Act, the Court had
held a similar North Carolina English literacy requirement constitutional.14 With section 4(e), therefore, Congress invalidated a statute
much like one the Court explicitly had declared constitutional.' 4 8 While
the dissent in Katzenbach saw section 4(e) as an impermissible intrusion
on states' rights and on the federal judiciary's authority to rule on equal
protection issues,149 the majority rejected this view, holding that the enforcement clause does not "confine the legislative power in this context to
the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the judicial
branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing
the judgment of the judiciary by particularizing the 'majestic generalities'
of [section] 1 of the Amendment." 15 o In other words, section five of the
fourteenth amendment gives Congress the power to interpret, as well as
to enforce, the equal protection clause and to render unconstitutional
state laws that conflict with the congressional interpretation.'
Katzenbach, however, limited congressional interpretive power to expanding equal protection, as opposed to diluting it.'" 2 While this distinction is sometimes hazy, it means that Congress may not, while
purporting to enforce equal protection, abrogate an affirmative equal protection right. 53 Assuming a statute passed this test, however, the Katzen145. See id at 646-47.
146. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
147. See id at 53-54.
148. See supra notes 14245 and accompanying text. Katzenbach did not overrule
Lassiter. It implicitly held, however, that Congress had the right to supercede the
Court's holding in Lassiter. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966).
149. See id at 659 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
150. Id at 648-49.
151. See Bohrer, supra note 32, at 492; see also id at 493 ("Congress cannot possibly
'enforce' section 1 of the fourteenth amendment without first interpreting the provisions
to be enforced."); Cohen, CongressionalPower to InterpretDue Processand Equal Protection, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 603, 605 (1975) (stating that in Katzenbach, the Court gave Congress the latitude to decide that the "denial of voting rights was itself a denial of equal
protection"); Cox, Foreword ConstitutionalAdjudication and the Promotion of Human
Rights, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 91, 106 (1966) ("The substance of [Katzenbach] is that Congress
may decide, within broad limits, how the general principle of equal protection applies to
actual conditions.").
152. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966).
153. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 528 & n.7 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Rotunda, supra note 17, § 19.4 at 734. The Katzenbach Court attempted to define
the distinction by stating:
[section] 5 does not grant Congress power... to enact "statutes so as in effect to
dilute equal protection... decisions of this Court...." Thus, for example, an
enactment authorizing the States to establish racially segregated systems of education would not be ... a measure "to enforce" the Equal Protection Clause
since that clause of its own force prohibits such state laws.
Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10 (quoting id at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
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bach Court was willing to give it extremely broad deference."'
2.

Enforcement Clause Authority as Applied to Affirmative Action

Because it is plausible that affirmative action violates the equal protection rights of those it disadvantages, it can be argued that congressional
enactment of affirmative action falls on the dilution side of the Katzenbach analysis. When the Supreme Court, in Fullilove v. Klutznick, analyzed a congressional affirmative action statute in light of the

action fell
enforcement clause, however, it held, in effect, that affirmative
55
on the permissible side of the dilution/expansion line.1

The affirmative action at issue in Fullilove, embodied in the Public
Works Employment Act of 1977,156 consisted of a ten percent set-aside

of federal funds for minority business enterprises in local construction

projects. 157 In upholding the PWEA under the equal protection component of the fifth amendment, 5 8 the plurality relied heavily on Congress'

unique enforcement clause power, stating that the fact "[t]hat the program may press the outer limits of congressional authority affords no
basis for striking it down."' 159 In other words, the ten percent quota,

while perhaps unconstitutional if enacted by a state legislature or im-

posed by a court, falls within the scope of Congress' section five power. ' o
The congressional action at issue in Fullilove differed from that ad154. See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 653 ("It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis
upon which the Congress might resolve the conflict as it did."); Cox, supra note 151, at
104 (under § 5 analysis, "the Court will eschew reviewing legislative judgments upon the
relation of means to ends").
155. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 490-92 (1980).
156. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1982).
157. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 453-54 (discussing 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1982)).
158. This "equal protection component" was first articulated by the Supreme Court in
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). Boiling noted that federal equal protection,
because it is only implicit in federal due process, was a less stringent standard than the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, which applies only to states and
their constituent bodies. See id.; Bohrer, supra note 32, at 476-78.
Subsequently, the Court stated that "[its] approach to Fifth Amendment equal protection claims has always been precisely the same as to equal protection claims under the
Fourteenth Amendment." Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 638 n.2 (1975). In
Fullilove v. Klutznick, however, by requiring only "reasonable assurance" of the constitutionality of the PWEA, see 448 U.S. 448, 490 (1980), the Court appeared to return to the
looser Boiling standard. See Bohrer, supra note 32, at 509-10.
This looser standard is necessary if Congress is to be allowed to exercise its full power
under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment. See id. at 478. Interestingly,
it appears to resemble the intermediate standard of review proposed by the liberal position in Bakke, see supra note 94 and accompanying text, the difference being that the
moderate position would reserve it solely for acts of Congress. See Fullilove, 448 U.S. at
472-73.
159. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 490.
160. See id. at 476. The PWEA implicates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, which does not apply to congressional actions in general, see supra
note 158, because many of the federal grants under the Act are channeled through state
and local governments, see Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 457.
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dressed in Katzenbach 6 ' in one significant regard: rather than merely
affecting the balance of federalism, it directly implicated the right of individuals (here, white contractors) to be free from invidious discrimination.' 62 The Fulilove Court nevertheless found Katzenbach applicable,
relying on that case for the broad proposition that "'[c]orrectly viewed,
§ 5 is a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining whether and what legislation is needed
to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.' "163 That
power, the Fulliove Court held, extended even to race-conscious
distinctions. 1"
3.

Enforcement Clause Authority Applied to Title VII

The congressional intent behind the EEOA, 6 5 which was passed pursuant to section five,1 66 should receive the same judicial deference as the
Voting Rights Act' 61 and the PWEA.' 6 The Supreme Court has held
that Congress intended voluntary affirmative action plans instituted by
employers covered by Title VII to be shielded from liability 169 if created
in response to a manifest imbalance." 0 Congress also intended that the
statute's provisions apply with the same force to public and private employers alike."' Therefore, because Title ViI's manifest imbalance standard governs private employers,' 72 it should govern public employers as
well. The manifest imbalance standard, however, can govern claims
against public employers only if it is constitutional under the equal protection clause. Because the manifest imbalance standard allows the use
of race or sex as one factor in promotion or hiring decisions as part of a
narrowly tailored plan," 3 it is, in light of the more rigid ten-percent
quota allowed in Fulliove,"4 clearly within Congress' section five au161. See supra notes 141-54 and accompanying text.
162. See Bohrer, supra note 32, at 509.
163. Fulliove, 448 U.S. at 476 (quoting Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651
(1966)).
164. See i. at 482-84.
165. See supra notes 13 & 136 (discussing congressional intent behind EEOA).
166. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
167. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653 (1966); supra notes 150-51 and
accompanying text.
168. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480 (1980); supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
169. Justice Stevens, concurring in Johnson, aptly described the role of Title VII in
authorizing voluntary affirmative action plans: "As a shield, an antidiscrimination statute can also help a member of a protected class by assuring decisionmakers in some
instances that, when they elect for good reasons of their own to grant a preference of
some sort to a minority citizen, they will not violate the law." Johnson v. Transportation
Agency, 107 S.CL 1442, 1458 (1987) (Stevens, J.,concurring).
170. See supra note 136 and accompanying text
171. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
172. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200, 209 (1979); supra text accompanying note 13.
173. See supra note 21.
174. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 492 (1980).
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thority. It is therefore constitutional.
By telling the courts to apply to the states the same constitutional def-

erence granted to itself, Congress has reversed the usual flow of power

under the fourteenth amendment.1 75 That this act is unusual, however,
does not render it invalid. The Supreme Court has upheld similar delegations in other contexts1 76 and has hinted that it might do so in affirmative action cases. 177 Fullilove, for example, indicates that the

Constitution does not prohibit Congress from encouraging voluntary affirmative action plans by public employers. 17 Professor William Cohen,

supporting Congress' right to make such delegations, argues that "[iln
appropriate circumstances, Congress should be able to authorize the

states to enact legislation that, in the absence of congressional consent,
would run afoul of the due process or equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment." 179 Therefore, the existence of congressional ap-

proval, through Title VII, should represent the difference between the
success or failure of affirmative action plans under the Constitution.
Given the national policy of encouraging locally-adopted affirmative
action plans voiced in Title VIIIs° and discussed by the Supreme Court
in Weber ' and Johnson,I 2 such plans should receive judicial deference.

Realizing that far too many manifest imbalances exist throughout the
country for it to handle itself, Congress chose, through Title VII, to leave
factual findings to the individual public agencies as employers,1 3 grant175. The fourteenth amendment clearly was intended to take power from the states
and give it to Congress. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455-56 (1976); Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-48 (1879).
176. See, e.g., Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 174
(1985) (Congress may delegate its full commerce clause authority); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 880 & n.8 (1985) (stating in dictum that had Congress so
chosen, it could have shielded states from equal protection challenges to a federal law,
delegating to states the power to regulate their insurance industries, to the same extent
§ 5 shielded Congress); Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization,
451 U.S. 648, 655 n.6 (1981) (same); see also I R. Rotunda, J. Nowak & J. Young, Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 4.8, at 293 n.3 (1986) (congressional grants of authority to states are limited only by specific constitutional restrictions
on congressional action).
177. In Bakke, Justice Powell indicated that the admissions plan might not have been
struck down had it been enacted pursuant to a Title VII consent decree. See Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302 n.41 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
178. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 484 (1980) ("where Congress has authority to declare certain conduct [such as employment discrimination] unlawful, it may,
as here, authorize and induce state action to avoid such conduct.") (emphasis added); see
also Bakke, 438 U.S. at 373 (Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (Congress' preference of voluntary remedies under Title VI
mandates "considerable judicial deference" to voluntary affirmative action plans in
education).
179. Cohen, CongressionalPower to Validate UnconstitutionalState Laws: A Forgotten
Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 387, 388 (1983).

180.
181.
182.
183.

See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 204 (1979).
See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 1452-53 (1987).
See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
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ing them the same broad constitutional authority Congress would have if
it had acted directly.'
By so doing, Congress intended that courts use
the same deferential standard of judicial review that the Supreme Court
applied to the PWEA in Fullove."5
Some Supreme Court and lower federal court decisions, at least in
part, appear to have based the legality of a given affirmative action plan
on the "competence" of the governmental body that initiated the plan."8 6
For example, the plurality in Bakke, in part, rejected the Regents' plan
because it found educational overseers, charged only with running
schools, incompetent to alleviate societal discrimination.18 7 The Fullilove
plurality contrasted that limited competence with the unique competence
of Congress to treat national societal problems."8 ' The large number of
state and local legislative and administrative bodies, however, makes the
competence analysis difficult to apply with any consistency, resulting in
confusing decisions."8 9 The courts can eliminate this problem by simply
looking to congressional competence as demonstrated in Fulliove. 9"
CONCLUSION

Employment discrimination is an issue of national importance and deserves a uniform national policy. Congress stated as much when it
passed Title VII in 1964. It reaffirmed this statement by extending the
Act's provisions to state and local governments through the EEOA in
1972. An aspect of this implied policy, as courts have recognized, is the
desirability of avoiding litigation by allowing employers to remedy manifest racial or gender imbalances by adopting narrowly tailored affirmative
184. See supra notes 155-64 and accompanying text.
185. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480, 491 (1980).
186. See infra note 189.
187. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307-10 (1978).
188. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 483-84 (1980).
189. See, e.g., Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 274-76 (1986) (local
school board not competent to remedy societal discrimination); J.A. Croson Co. v. City
of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355, 1364 (4th Cir. 1987) (Sprouse, J., dissenting) (Richmond
City Council as competent in its jurisdiction as Congress, and deserves similar deference),
prob.juris. noted, 108 S. Ct. 1010 (1988); Janowiak v. Corporate City of South Bend, 750
F.2d 557, 561 (7th Cir. 1984) (agency responsible for fire department is competent to
make findings of past discrimination and remedy that discrimination), vacated on other
grounds, 107 S. Ct. 1620 (1987). See generally Comment, supra note 99, at 612-23 (arguing for varying degrees of judicial deference-greatest to Congress and state legislatures,
less to local elected bodies, least to administrative agencies).
190. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 483-84 (1980). Congress possesses the
constitutional power to mandate even a quota, albeit a flexible one. See id. at 454, 492. It
has the authority to shield employers from Title VII liability if they seek to correct a
manifest imbalance. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 107 S. Ct. 1442, 1458 (1987)
(Stevens, J., concurring). If, in order to make the Title VII shield meaningful, Congress
must delegate to local authorities its power under the Constitution, Congress may do that
as well. See supra note 176 and accompanying text; see also Cohen, supra note 179, at
411-12 ("The question to be answered in all cases is whether Congress would have power
to make substantive policy choices analogous to those made in the state laws Congress
had approved.").
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action plans. Consistent with this goal, Congress has authorized public
employers to determine when such an imbalance exists and to remedy it.
Many courts have upheld voluntary affirmative action plans under
both Title VII and the equal protection clause without relying on a theory of congressional authorization. This congressional authorization
analysis, however, unlike the more haphazard approaches generally used,
has at least two added benefits: it provides a standard that is uniform
and clear to both employers and courts, and, even more compelling, it
gives due respect to Congress' enforcement clause powers. Because the
national policy of eliminating employment discrimination is set by Congress, the constitutional standard, even as applied to local government
actors, should reflect the broad latitude allowed Congress under the fifth
amendment equal protection standard and the enforcement clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The manifest imbalance standard of Title VII
reflects Congress' considered choice; it should also be the constitutional
standard applied to the states under the equal protection clause.
Ronald W. Adelman

